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“The More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble
You Can Be”:1 How Government Surveillance
of Muslim Americans2 Violates First
Amendment Rights
Madiha Shahabuddin*
INTRODUCTION
When Imam Hamid Hassan Raza, leader of Brooklyn’s
Masjid Al-Ansar, meets newcomers at his mosque, he treads
carefully.3 After learning of the New York Police Department
(NYPD)’s targeted surveillance of Muslim “hotspots”4 such as

* JD, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, May 2015; BA, University
of California, Irvine, June 2012. I would like to thank Professor Ronald Steiner for his
invaluable supervision and feedback as a faculty advisor; Fatima Dadabhoy, Esq. for
allowing me to gain insight from her experiences as a civil rights attorney; and the
Chapman Law Review staff for their efforts in producing this Comment. Finally, I would
like to thank my friends and family for their support in this endeavor, my fiancé for his
unwavering encouragement, and most importantly, my parents, who helped make all of
this a reality.
1 Taken from a quote by a nineteen-year-old female Muslim student at Brooklyn
College, New York, on how the NYPD’s surveillance of the Muslim community treats their
religious expression and behavior. Her full quote reads: “It’s as if the law says: the more
Muslim you are, the more trouble you can be, so decrease your Islam.” MUSLIM AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES COALITION (MACLC) ET AL., MAPPING MUSLIMS: NYPD SPYING AND ITS
IMPACT ON AMERICAN MUSLIMS 12 (2012) [hereinafter MAPPING MUSLIMS ], available at
http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/Mapping-Muslims.pdf.
2 The term “Muslim Americans” will be used throughout this Comment to describe
citizens and residents of the United States who are Muslim, i.e., ascribe to the faith of
Islam. For an interesting discussion on the “hyphenated identities” of second generation
Muslims in the United States, see generally Selcuk R. Sirin & Michelle Fine, Hyphenated
Selves: Muslim American Youth Negotiating Identities on the Fault Lines of Global
Conflict, 11 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 151 (2007); YVONNE YAZBECK HADDAD, NOT QUITE
AMERICAN?: THE SHAPING OF ARAB AND MUSLIM IDENTITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2004).
As a reflection of such hybrid identities, according to a 2011 Gallup Report, “Muslim
Americans [i]dentify [w]ith the United States and [t]heir [f]aith [e]qually.” ABU DHABI
GALLUP CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: FAITH, FREEDOM, AND THE FUTURE 50 (2011)
[hereinafter GALLUP REPORT], available at http://turcopolier.typepad.com/files/mar_rep
ort_adgc_bilingual_072011_sa_lr_web.pdf.
3 Complaint at 14, Raza v. City of New York, 998 F. Supp. 2d 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(No. 13–CV–3448), 2013 WL 6177392 at *1, available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/
default/files/assets/nypd_surveillance_complaint_-_final_06182013_1.pdf.
4 See Petra Bartosiewicz, NYPD Surveillance of Muslims Has Created a Climate of
Fear, NATION (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/173400/nypd-surveil
lance-muslims-has-created-climate-fear (“The NYPD’s counterterrorism strategy, which
was developed in part by former and current CIA officials, has focused on ‘intelligence
collection’ intended to thwart potential terrorist plots through the heavy scrutiny of
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Muslim businesses and mosques for counterterror intelligence
gathering, he “is hesitant to approach newcomers until they are
better known in the Masjid Al-Ansar community.”5 Due to
multiple “chance” encounters with plainclothes police officers,6
threats of his sermons being taken out of context and used
against him,7 and his fears of what being targeted by the NYPD
would mean for his wife and child,8 Raza has “considered leaving
the pulpit.”9
Ironically, Masjid Al-Ansar is named after the Arabic word
ansar, which means “the helpers” and in the Islamic tradition
refers to the support and sense of community fostered during the
time when the Prophet Muhammad and his followers had newly
arrived to the city of Madina.10 After the Associated Press broke
the news about the NYPD’s “Muslim Surveillance Program” in
August 2011,11 mosque
[c]ongregants grew even more suspicious of newcomers [for fear they
were informants], and a constant sense of suspicion now exists among
the mosque’s congregants. There [was] . . . a steep decline in mosque
attendance, as the number of worshippers attending afternoon
prayers on weekdays . . . declined from approximately twenty people
to just two or three people.12

A once “vibrant and lively mosque community” dwindled into a
fearful group of isolated individuals apprehensive about the
consequences of their mosque attendance and regular interaction
with others in their community, disallowing the opportunity for
Masjid Al-Ansar to live up to its name.13 Raza in particular found
that his wariness of new mosque attendees prevented him from

so-called Muslim ‘hot spots’ such as mosques.”); see also MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1,
at 12 (noting that the NYPD “mapped, photographed or infiltrated at least 250 mosques
in the New York City [area] . . . and deemed these places of worship ‘hot spots,’ with any
activity in or around the mosques meriting surveillance”).
5 Complaint, supra note 3, at 14.
6 Id. at 10–11.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 14.
9 Id.
10 Ansar - Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/ansar (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
11 See generally Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, With CIA Help, NYPD Moves
Covertly in Muslim Areas, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 23, 2011, available at
http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2011/With-CIA-help-NYPD-moves-covertly-in
-Muslim-areas; Highlights of AP’s Pulitzer Prize-Winning Probe into NYPD Intelligence
Operations, ASSOCIATED PRESS, http://www.ap.org/media-center/nypd/investigation (last
visited Oct. 13, 2013) [hereinafter AP NYPD Probe].
12 Complaint, supra note 3, at 15.
13 Id. at 16.
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“effectively [fulfilling] his role as a religious and spiritual
counselor and teacher.”14
On June 18, 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), Creating Law Enforcement Accountability and
Responsibility (CLEAR) Project, and New York Civil Liberties
Union (NYCLU) filed a lawsuit on behalf of Raza (the named
plaintiff) and other Muslim individuals who were targeted by
NYPD surveillance, alleging that they suffered injuries caused by
such conduct.15 The lawsuit was filed against the City of New
York, Mayor Bloomberg, Police Commissioner Raymond W.
Kelly, and other city officials. The complaint alleged
“suspicionless surveillance” of “mapped” Muslim individuals and
organizations and the deployment of informants “without any
suspicion of wrongdoing.”16 Raza v. City of New York represents
one of the more recent and publicized legal challenges to the
government’s surveillance of Muslim Americans without any
other indication of suspicion or wrongdoing except being Muslim,
or perhaps, as this Comment will discuss, being “too Muslim.”17
On April 15, 2014, after months of public outcry—and
undoubtedly bad press18—the NYPD announced it would disband
the controversial and constitutionally suspect “Zone Assessment
Id. at 14.
Id. at 2; Raza v. City of New York - Legal Challenge to NYPD Muslim Surveillance
Program, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/national-security/raza-v-citynew-york-legal-challenge-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
16 Complaint, supra note 3, at 1.
17 Hassan v. City of New York, filed in federal district court in New Jersey, similarly
alleged NYPD spying on Muslim individuals and institutions, including an all-girls
Muslim school. Federal District Judge William Martini dismissed the suit on February
20, 2014. It was “[t]he first legal challenge to the New York police department’s blanket
surveillance of Muslims in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.” Ed Pilkington, Federal
Judge Tosses Out Legal Challenge over NYPD Surveillance of Muslims, GUARDIAN (Feb.
21, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/nypd-muslim-surveillance-legalchallenge-judge. The Hassan plaintiffs alleged similar violations of the First Amendment
caused by law enforcement surveillance and its resulting effect on religious expression,
such as: lowered mosque attendance, avoidance of public prayer, and discontinuance of
religious or political discussions. Hassan v. City of New York, No. 2:12–3401 (WJM), 2014
WL 654604, at *2–3 (D. N.J. Feb. 20, 2014). The plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on
March 21, 2014. Hassan v. City of New York, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS., http://www.ccr
justice.org/Hassan (last visited Apr. 27, 2014).
18 See, e.g., Laila Alawa, America Is the Land of the Free — Unless You’re Muslim,
POLICYMIC (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.policymic.com/articles/83443/america-is-the-landof-the-free-unless-you-re-muslim (disapproving of Hassan case dismissal); Faiza Patel,
Blanket Spying on Muslims ‘Makes Us Less Safe’, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. (Mar. 25,
2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/blanket-spying-muslims-%E2%80%98mak
es-us-less-safe%E2%80%99 (pointedly critiquing New York City officials’ conduct in
connection with NYPD spying); Carla Murphy, NYPD (Finally) Gets Independent
Oversight, COLORLINES (Mar. 28, 2014, 5:55 PM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2014/03/
nypd_finally_gets_independent_oversight.html (applauding the announcement of a
first-ever inspector general with subpoena power and oversight authority over the NYPD
in the wake of stop-and-frisk and Muslim spying programs).
14
15
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Unit” (formerly called “Demographics Unit”) within their
department used to map Muslim communities in the region.19
This action by the NYPD could be heralded as the right step
towards ending the stigmatization of religious expression by
Muslim Americans and tells us that it is possible to refrain from
alienating and burdening an entire religious community in the
name of counterterrorism. Despite this move, however, some
question whether it will mean any real difference.20
This Comment will argue that the government’s targeted,
suspicionless surveillance of Muslim Americans in the name of
counterterror efforts has effectively restricted the Muslim
community’s First Amendment freedoms of association, religion,
and speech. Part I will discuss a brief background of surveillance,
leading up to a report on the current effects of surveillance
programs on Muslim Americans today. The discussion in Part II
will turn to the case law and legal standards for First
Amendment claims in the context of Muslim surveillance,
advocating for and applying the strict scrutiny test to establish
that the government’s conduct has in fact infringed on Muslim
Americans’ rights to free association, religion, and speech. Part
III will then conclude by offering solutions to counterterror
efforts which do not criminalize mere adherence to a particular
faith, including a cease of widespread government surveillance
(i.e., not treating Muslims as a suspect class) and offering gang
intervention models as a possible alternative to the current
practice of government counterterrorism programs.
I. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF SURVEILLANCE
A. What Is Surveillance?
Professor Christopher Slobogin defines surveillance as
“government efforts to gather information about people from a
distance, usually covertly and without entry into private
spaces.”21 Surveillance as a general phenomenon is then broken
19 Editorial, Spying at the N.Y.P.D., N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.ny
times.com/2014/04/17/opinion/spying-at-the-nypd.html.
20 See Anna Lekas Miller, The NYPD Has Disbanded Its Most Notorious Spy Unit,
but Is the Age of Muslim Surveillance Really Over?, NATION (Apr. 23, 2014),
http://www.thenation.com/article/179504/nypd-has-disbanded-its-most-notorious-spy-unitage-muslim-surveillance-really-over. One community leader noted that although the Zone
Assessment Unit “doesn’t exist anymore, there is all this information that they have
compiled . . . [and w]e have questions about whether . . . the forms of profiling that the
unit was engaged in will transform or change into newer forms of profiling under the
auspices of other units.” Id.
21 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 3 (2007); see also NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI -TERRORISM AND
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 443 (2003) (explaining that “political surveillance . . . is aimed
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down into three categories: 1) communications surveillance,
which is “the real-time interception of communications”;
2) physical surveillance, which is “the real-time observation of
physical activities”; and 3) transaction surveillance, which is the
“accessing [of] recorded information about communications,
activities, and other transactions.”22 According to Slobogin, since
9/11, “the United States government has been obsessed, as
perhaps it should be, with ferreting out national security
threats,” but “more than occasionally it has also visited
significant intrusion on large numbers of law-abiding citizens—
sometimes inadvertently, sometimes not.”23 Within the context of
national security, intelligence gathering24 of pattern occurrences
in neighborhoods and communities is intended to “analyze broad
or meaningful trends” as a means of assessing the validity and
likelihood of a national security threat.25
Such intelligence gathering, however, armed with a
prejudicial purpose can result in “selective surveillance” that
imposes burdens on Muslim Americans’ First Amendment rights,
further alienating this particular community from the
government.26 The surveillance of Muslim Americans operates
along a similar, yet covert, vein of the “Broken Windows”27 theory
of policing. Developed by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling,
this theory posits that when a community riddled with violence
and crime becomes less tolerant of the minor causes of social
disorder, a decrease in violent crime will result.28
Implementation of the Broken Windows theory has resulted in
aggressive “zero tolerance policing” in New York City, with its
stated goal being to increase misdemeanor arrests on the streets

at uncovering criminal behavior” and occurs “in contexts where there is no specific
evidence of criminal behavior that triggered the investigatory activity”).
22 SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 3.
23 Id. at 3–4.
24 Like David Smith’s work, this Comment will treat surveillance and intelligence
gathering as synonymous. See generally David Smith, Presumed Suspect: Post-9/11
Intelligence Gathering, Race, and the First Amendment, 11 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L.
85, 131 (2012).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 133; TREVOR AARONSON, THE TERROR FACTORY: INSIDE THE FBI’S
MANUFACTURED WAR ON TERRORISM 49–50 (2013); see also ABRAMS , supra note 21 (noting
the “concern about the chilling effect of government’s intrusion into the arena of political
and religious discourse and possible trenching on First Amendment freedoms”).
27 This theory is named after an analogy George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson
espoused in a 1982 article they published in The Atlantic: “[I]f a window in a building is
broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. . . . One
unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows
costs nothing.” GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, F IXING BROKEN
WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 19 (1996).
28 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICE SCIENCE 112 (Jack R. Greene ed., 3d ed. 2007).
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in an effort to reduce other, more violent crime.29 While there has
been much social science research conducted to test the Broken
Windows theory, “there is no reliable empirical support for the
proposition that disorder causes crime or that broken-windows
policing reduces serious crime.”30
Taken from a broader lens, this theory, which supports the
policing and monitoring of one another within a community,
creates a problematic phenomenon when placed within the
context of Muslim American surveillance. Implementation of
forms of the Broken Windows theory into Muslim intelligence
gathering has resulted in the widespread distrust and fear of the
Muslim community vis-à-vis not only law enforcement, but also
vis-à-vis itself.31 It is an unfortunate and inherently unjust
consequence of the billions of dollars the government has
invested to survey, track, infiltrate, and even prosecute Muslim
Americans.32 Indeed, as civil rights attorney Fatima Dadabhoy
poses it, it seems the question now remains: “Does this mean that
Muslims are merely subjected to a second tier system of free
speech that relates to their faith?”33
B. A Brief History of Surveillance
While government surveillance of certain individuals and
communities is nothing new, its objectionable nature persists. In
the 1920s, under the direction of J. Edgar Hoover, the
Department of Justice’s General Intelligence Division
maintained a list of 450,000 names of individuals who were
considered “Bolshevik” or “Soviet-inspired.”34 In addition to
wiretapping and trespassing, among the individuals the Justice
Department identified for their list were Hellen Keller and future
Supreme Court justices Felix Frankfurter and Arthur Goldberg.35

Id.
Id.
See infra notes 136–143 and accompanying text.
AARONSON, supra note 26, at 16–17, 44–45, 49–50, 234; see also STEPHEN DOWNS
& KATHY MANLEY, PROJECT SALAM & NAT ’L COAL. TO PROTECT CIVIL FREEDOMS ,
INVENTING TERRORISTS: THE LAWFARE OF PREEMPTIVE PROSECUTION 33 (2014), available
at http://www.projectsalam.org/Inventing-Terrorists-study.pdf (“It may be that in order to
bypass constitutional prohibitions against mass surveillance, the government has
preemptively prosecuted hundreds of (mostly) Muslims in the last decade in order to
create the illusion of a terrorist threat to the U.S.—which would justify the secret mass
surveillance spy network.”).
33 Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, Civil Rights Manager, Council on Am. Islamic
Relations, in Anaheim, Cal. (Jan. 31, 2014).
34 Nancy Murray & Sarah Wunsch, Civil Liberties in Times of Crisis: Lessons from
History, 87 MASS . L. REV. 72, 78 (2002).
35 Id. at 78–79.
29
30
31
32
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During World War II, the Japanese community in California
was mapped much like the mapping of Muslim communities in
the United States today, the justification then being that it would
protect America from another attack after Pearl Harbor.36 Local
law enforcement have recently implemented mapping and
surveillance programs of Muslims, as evinced by the 2007 Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) plan to map local Muslims
and the more recent NYPD surveillance of East Coast/New York
area Muslims, which “[e]erily . . . bears [a] striking resemblance
to the mistreatment experienced by Japanese Americans in the
wake of Pearl Harbor.”37
In 1956, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) began its
Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which spied on
individuals and groups identified as “subversive” to
“neutralize . . . radical or immoral activity.”38 Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., the NAACP, civil rights groups, the ACLU, and even
the Boy Scouts of America were targets of government spying in
this era, for fear that these organizations or individuals were
infiltrated, or influenced, by Communism.39 A few decades later,
during the 1960s and 1970s, the government cast its net of
surveillance wider, to include anti-Vietnam War advocates, the
Black Panthers, the “New Left,” and women’s rights groups.40 It
was around this time that local law enforcement set up their own
programs to conduct surveillance on a local level, such as the
“New York Red Squad,” which “was reported to have files on over
one million people.”41 After the 1972 attacks at the Munich
Olympic Games and “[a]s early as 1986, the government was
considering plans to use two military bases to detain Arab- and
Iranian-Americans in the same vein as the Japanese internment
of World War II.”42

36 Rabea Chaudhry, Effective Advocacy in a Time of Terror: Redefining the Legal
Representation of a Suspected Terrorist Facing Secret Evidence, 8 UCLA J. ISLAMIC
& NEAR E.L. 101, 106 (2009).
37 Id. at 106–07 (“‘Just as Asian Americans have been “raced” as foreign, and from
there as presumptively disloyal, Arab American[s] and Muslims have been “raced” as
“terrorists”: foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening.’”) (quoting Natsu Taylor Saito,
Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the “Racing” of Arab Americans
as “Terrorists”, 8 ASIAN AM. L.J. 1, 12 (2001)); see also Complaint, supra note 3, at 1–3.
38 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 34, at 81 (internal quotations omitted); see also
Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, Civil Liberties in the Struggle Against Terror, in LEGAL
ISSUES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERROR 141, 163 n.46 (John Norton Moore & Robert F.
Turner eds., 2010) (describing COINTELPRO tactics as “generally illegal and focused on
repressing political dissent”).
39 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 34, at 81; Smith, supra note 24, at 140–41.
40 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 34, at 81; Eric Lane, On Madison, Muslims, and
the New York City Police Department, 40 HOFSTRA L. R EV. 689, 695–96 (2012).
41 Murray & Wunsch, supra note 34, at 81.
42 Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Informant, 85 WASH. L. REV. 687, 705 (2010).
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Most recently, the post-9/11 era has been characterized by
government surveillance of Muslim American communities in the
name of counterterrorism efforts.43 The government’s conduct in
this surveillance program was highlighted in news stories that
broke around August 2011 about the NYPD conducting mass
surveillance of Muslim communities in New York.44 The
Associated Press ran a series of investigative reports on this
topic, noting that the NYPD effectively “monitored every aspect
of Muslim life and built databases on where innocent Muslims
eat, shop, work and pray.”45 And in July 2014, it was revealed
that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had—at the
minimum—spied on five “politically active” Muslim American
leaders, including a past Bush administration official, a
successful attorney, a Rutgers professor, a former California
State University professor, and an executive director of the
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR).46
At the root of these investigations is the tool of profiling,
which allows the NYPD, FBI, or other governmental entity to
target certain groups of individuals solely based upon their
religious affiliation and pursue an almost carte blanche “fishing
expedition” for evidence condemning the targeted Muslim of
some link to terrorist activity.47 Justification for this treatment of
Muslim American communities has come from the idea that the
post-9/11 era calls for “urgent” action to thwart mass destruction
that can come from a potential terror attack, and therefore—as
the argument goes—constitutional infringements like this are a
“small price to pay for [America’s] safety.”48
C. Surveillance of Muslim Americans
At the core of this issue is what Sahar F. Aziz has called
“selective counterterrorism enforcement.”49 This manifests itself

See generally MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1; Bartosiewicz, supra note 4.
See generally AP NYPD Probe, supra note 11.
Lane, supra note 40, at 699 (citing Matt Apuzzo, NYPD-CIA Alliance’s Authority
Questioned, A SSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 21, 2012, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.
com/USCP/PNI/NEWS/2012-01-21-BCUSNYPD-Intelligence3rd-LdWritethru_ST_U.htm).
46 Elias Isquith, New Greenwald Bombshell: NSA Spied on 5 Politically Active
Muslim-Americans, S ALON (July 9, 2014, 7:11 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/07/09/
new_greenwald_bombshell_nsa_targeted_5_politically_active_muslim_americans/.
47 See generally Lane, supra note 40, at 702–07 (noting that if the NYPD cannot find
their Muslim terror suspect, “they will watch as many [Muslims] as possible in hopes of
catching a glimpse of one who appears to be traveling along the route they judge to be
leading to committing or aiding in terrorism”).
48 Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Profiling, Terrorism, and Time, 109 PENN ST. L. REV.
1181, 1199 (2005).
49 Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV . NAT ’L SECURITY J.
147, 183–84 (2014).
43
44
45
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in: the disproportionate targeting of Muslims for surveillance;50
government-sent informants tasked with infiltration and what
many have argued should be legally considered entrapment of
individuals;51 and mapping and spying on predominantly Muslim
neighborhoods, Muslim-owned businesses, mosques, and Muslim
Student Associations.52 Outside the scope of this Comment, but
still critically troubling, are the deportations of religious leaders
and imams for sermons “deemed too critical of the American
government,”53 the criminalization and prosecution of charitable
and humanitarian aid organizations under sweeping material
support statutes,54 and private acts of prejudice against Muslims
in the form of mosque vandalism and employment
discrimination.55
As author and investigative journalist Trevor Aaronson
argues, in the context of surveillance of Muslims, the government
has used intelligence gathering as a means of “manufacturing”
counterterror prosecutions that result in “what a federal judge
has called a ‘fantasy terror operation’” created and incited by a
government informant.56 Such intelligence gathering assists the
government “in furtherance of an adversarial system that
prioritizes bolstering the number of terrorism investigations,
prosecutions, and convictions of Muslims in America.”57
50 See Kirstie Ball & Frank Webster, The Intensification of Surveillance, in THE
INTENSIFICATION OF SURVEILLANCE: CRIME, TERRORISM AND WARFARE IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 1, 20 (Kirstie Ball & Frank Webster eds., 2003) (“Responses to
September 11 have increased possibilities for ‘racial’ profiling along ‘Arab’ lines in
particular, the consequences of which are already seen in the American detention of
several thousand ‘suspects’ and a FBI trawl of more than 200 campuses to collect
information about ‘Middle Eastern’ students.”).
51 Aziz, supra note 49; see also AARONSON, supra note 26, at 146, 195.
52 AP NYPD Probe, supra note 11; Complaint, supra note 3, at 5–9.
53 Aziz, supra note 49, at 184.
54 Id. at 184–85; 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012). “The government employs an extremely
broad criminal substantive standard—material support—which encompasses any activity
in association with a group classified as a terrorist organization. Giving [an] organization
money is the most obvious example of material support, but even the volunteering of one’s
time also constitutes material support.” Symposium, Left Out in the Cold? The Chilling of
Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1203, 1213–14
(2008).
55 Aziz, supra note 49, at 186; see, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, Abercrombie & Fitch Liable for Religious Discrimination in EEOC Suit, Court
Says (Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-9-13.cfm (noting
employer unlawfully discriminated against female Muslim employee wearing a
headscarf). The “secret evidence” problem similarly strips Muslim defendants of their
rights. David Cole, professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center, has stated that
in the context of terror prosecutions, “[t]he government has . . . informed us that it is
relying on classified evidence that it cannot tell us about. So we must defend the group
without knowing the accusations against it, and without seeing most of the evidence in
the file.” Symposium, supra note 54, at 1216. See generally Chaudhry, supra note 36.
56 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 234–35.
57 Aziz, supra note 49, at 182.
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Additionally, Aziz refutes the presumption about domestic or
“homegrown” terrorism in the United States being the result of
radicalization of all Muslim Americans within their own
communities.58 One category of these “homegrown terrorism”
cases involve most often “young, vulnerable men with mental
health or financial problems upon whom paid informants prey.
Often, these informants also play leading roles in concocting and
implementing the fake terrorist plot.”59
Ironically, for all the emphasis placed on rooting out the
“homegrown” terrorists in Muslim communities, Aziz argues that
“[i]ndeed, Muslim communities know much less than law
enforcement about these cases because, unlike community
members, law enforcement has information drawn from
extensive surveillance networks and intelligence databases at the
local, state, and federal level.”60 As a result of this “[p]ervasive
government scrutiny of Muslim communities,” Muslims feel
“pressured to downplay their religious identity” and “fear
becoming too active in . . . religious activities” because they worry
that these are “indicative” to the government of “terrorist
inclinations.”61
In a report prepared by the Muslim American Civil Liberties
Coalition
(MACLC),
the
Creating
Law
Enforcement
Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) project, and the Asian
American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF), East
Coast Muslims were interviewed to assess their experiences with
being a part of a community targeted by NYPD surveillance.
Most interviewees acknowledged that the public appearance of a
Muslim identity would “invite[] unwanted attention or
surveillance from law enforcement.”62 Traditional or Islamic
garb, a beard, a hijab (headscarf), or a niqaab (face covering)
were such displays of a Muslim identity which, to the NYPD,
would “serve as indicators of ‘dangerousness.’”63 Some Muslims

See id. at 215.
Id. at 214–15. See generally Said, supra note 42. See also Jon Sherman, “A Person
Otherwise Innocent”: Policing Entrapment in Preventative, Undercover Counterterrorism
Investigations, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1475, 1478 (2009); Interview with Fatima
Dadabhoy, supra note 33; see AARONSON, supra note 26, at 146, 195; HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN RIGHTS INST., ILLUSION OF JUSTICE : HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES IN US TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 22 (2014), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/usterrorism0714_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf (noting that in the sting
operation cases studied, the government “often chose targets who were particularly
vulnerable—whether because of mental disability, or because they were indigent and
needed money that the government offered them”).
60 Aziz, supra note 49, at 215.
61 Id. at 180–81; Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, supra note 33.
62 MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 15.
63 Id.
58
59
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have stopped religious expression through praying in public,
wearing headscarves, growing beards (an Islamic tradition), or
donning Islamic or “Muslim looking” garb.64 As one interviewee,
an interfaith community organizer, put it, “[a] hijab or beard
isn’t just about being different and not fitting in . . . it’s also that
people will see me as [someone who is] prone to violence.”65
One Muslim student attending Brooklyn College said his
parents forbid him from attending Muslim Student Association
events on campus and wearing the Islamic skullcap in public, out
of fear of being openly identified as a Muslim based on
appearances.66 In addition, “[l]aw enforcement scrutiny of
outward manifestations of ‘Muslim’ characteristics” prompted
some Muslims to alter their appearances and the practice of their
faith.67 A City University of New York (CUNY) student found
that this scrutiny of outward Muslim appearances made some
people “water down” the practice of their religion, an unfortunate
and unwarranted consequence of the government surveillance.68
One professor at Baruch College stated that in a class discussion,
her Muslim students told her that participating in a Muslim
Student Association could lead to law enforcement scrutiny and
being labeled an extremist.69
These actions by the government and the resulting response
of fear by the Muslim community raise serious First Amendment
concerns, including the chilling of free association, which is
considered an expressive right. Implementing a form of guilt by
association, government surveillance and law enforcement create
a presumption that “Muslims . . . know more about each other
than other communities with members that have engaged in
domestic terrorism.”70

Aziz, supra note 49, at 181.
MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 15.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. One interviewee in the report said she hid her religious identity at her place of
employment, and another interviewee “wondered whether she should ‘water down’ her
‘Muslimness’ on her resume.” Id. at 30–31. The stigma Muslims carry for merely being
Muslim are stifling and stunting their opportunities for growth in society and the
workplace, forcing them to choose between their ability to freely express their religion or
practice a form of socially palatable Islam (if, even that, is palatable to begin with).
69 Id. at 31.
70 Aziz, supra note 49, at 182.
For example, law enforcement has yet to invest in community policing
programs focused on Christian evangelical communities that support bombing
abortion clinics or attacking doctors who administer abortions, far -right
Christian communities that stockpile weapons because they wish to overthrow
the government or believe the end of the world is near, or predominantly Anglo
64
65
66
67
68
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS INFRINGED
A. Freedom of Association
Freedom of association is a fundamental right expressly
recognized by the Supreme Court under the First Amendment.71
Associational freedoms have been recognized in two
forms: expressive and intimate.72 The United States Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut73 held that while freedom of
association “is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill
of Rights,” it is a peripheral First Amendment right.74 Moreover,
the Court declared “the First Amendment has a penumbra where
privacy is protected from government[] intrusion.”75 And
emphasizing its sanctity in relation to free expression, Justice
Douglas noted that
[t]he right of “association,” like the right of belief . . . is more than the
right to attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one’s
attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation
with it or by other lawful means. Association in that context is a form
of expression of opinion; and while it is not expressly included in the
First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express
guarantees fully meaningful. 76

The right to associate is thus a penumbral right of the First
Amendment, an “emanation[] from those guarantees [of the Bill
of Rights] that help give them life and substance.”77 The
government may, however, punish an individual with
membership in a particular association, but only if it can make a
showing that the individual “actively affiliated with a group,
knowing of its illegal objectives, and with the specific intent to
further those objectives.”78

patriot groups that engage in violence against undocumented immigrants
based on their opposition to immigration reform.
Id.

71 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1198 (4th
ed. 2011).
72 David A. Anderson, Jail, Jail, the Gang’s All Here: Senate Crime Bill Section 521,
The Criminal Street Gang Provision, 36 B.C. L. R EV. 527, 529 (1995); Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984).
73 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
74 Id. at 482.
75 Id. at 483.
76 Id. (emphasis added); see also SUSAN N. HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE WAR ON
TERROR AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 212 (2011) (“Civic associations have
proven indispensable in enabling individuals to stand up to the government in the past
decade, as they have at other points in our history.”).
77 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
78 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 1199.
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1. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson
In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,79 the Court
proclaimed that the of right of freedom of association warranted
strict scrutiny protection in the face of state coercion requiring
the NAACP’s Alabama regional office to produce membership
lists of their “rank-and-file” to the Alabama Attorney General.80
In Patterson, the state Attorney General sought to enjoin and
oust the NAACP from operating in Alabama because it was
allegedly violating an Alabama statute that required foreign (i.e.,
out of state) corporations to file a corporate charter with the
Secretary of State and designate a place of business for service of
process.81 When the NAACP refused to comply because it
believed it fell under an exemption in the state statute, the
Attorney General obtained a court order against the NAACP,
forcing it to produce “a large number of the Association’s records
and papers, including bank statements, leases, deeds, and
records containing the names and addresses of all Alabama
‘members’ and ‘agents’ of the Association.”82 After being held in
civil contempt and assessed a $10,000 fine, the NAACP
“substantially” complied with the production request, except for
producing the membership lists, which the Association argued
was a constitutional violation of their freedoms of speech and
assembly (as incorporated against the state of Alabama under
the Fourteenth Amendment).83
In agreeing with the NAACP, the Court reasoned that “[i]t is
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the
‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”84 In applying
strict scrutiny85 to government action that “may have the effect of
curtailing the freedom to associate,” the Court highlighted the
NAACP’s “uncontroverted showing” of the past harmful effects
members of the Association suffered as a result of revealing their
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Id. at 460, 466.
Id. at 451–52.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 453–54. At this point, the Alabama Circuit Court declared the NAACP in
continuing contempt and increased the fine to $100,000. Id. at 454.
84 Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
85 In this test the Supreme Court applies to certain highly protected rights, the
Court asks whether the governmental action in question is narrowly tailored (or
necessary) to achieve a compelling government interest. Id. at 460, 463. See generally
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (announcing a new standard of “the
most rigid scrutiny” for suspect government classifications); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71,
at 554; MILTON R. KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRINE 16–18 (2001).
79
80
81
82
83
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rank-and-file members, including “economic reprisal, loss of
employment, threat of physical coercion, and other
manifestations of public hostility.”86 The Court held that such
state action—compelled disclosure of membership lists revealing
the identities of members and the resulting stigma that came
with it—was
likely to affect adversely the ability of [the NAACP] and its members
to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly
have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw
from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of
fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and
of the consequences of this exposure.87

Thus, the Court prioritized the right of individuals as a group to
be free from government action that targeted them in a manner
that would cause them to feel reluctant or afraid to continue
participating in that group, because of the very important right
at the root of associational rights: free expression and speech.
2. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees
Notwithstanding the strength of First Amendment
protections of the freedom of association, the Court in Roberts
v. U.S. Jaycees88 still noted that “[t]he right to associate for
expressive purposes is not, however, absolute.”89 The government
may infringe on that right if their conduct is justified and
“serve[s] compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression
of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly
less restrictive of associational freedoms.”90 One compelling state
interest the Court has already recognized is an interest in
eradicating discrimination.91 Roberts dealt with the U.S. Jaycees,
a national organization of young men seeking to exclude female
membership and deny them equal benefits, which allegedly
violated a Minnesota state statute that prohibited discrimination
in public accommodation on the basis of race, religion, sex, color,
creed, disability, or national origin.92
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460–62.
Id. at 462–63 (emphasis added). The Court went on to reject the State’s argument
that those “harmful effects” were merely due to private conduct (i.e., private biases,
societal prejudices, etc.) not attributable to the state action of compelled production of
membership lists. Id. at 463. It emphasized that such a distinction is immaterial and that
“[t]he crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after
the initial exertion of state power represented by the production order that private action
takes hold.” Id.
88 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
89 Id. at 623.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 609.
86
87
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The Court held that the state’s goal in fighting historical
discrimination of minorities and women was a compelling
interest that did not attempt to suppress any particular message
of the U.S. Jaycees, and therefore justified state interference in
forcing the association to allow female members full benefits.93
Thus, Roberts establishes some limits on the right to the freedom
of association, namely, that the state may infringe upon the right
if it can prove: (1) a compelling interest, (2) the state action is
unrelated to the suppression of the association’s ideas, and
(3) there is no other less restrictive means of achieving that
compelling state interest.94 This test will later be applied to the
government surveillance of Muslim Americans.
3. Presbyterian Church v. United States
In 1989, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in the
affirmative on standing issues regarding the infiltration by the
Immigration Naturalization Services (INS) of several churches in
Arizona, upon the suspicion that these churches were harboring
refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala.95 The plaintiff
churches in Presbyterian Church v. United States alleged
violations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights due to the
INS’s covert surveillance and infiltration of churches with agents
wearing “body bugs” that recorded prayers and church services
without a warrant or probable cause.96 The allegations regarding
the government’s violation of First Amendment rights to free
exercise of religion, speech, and association stemmed from what
the Court of Appeals concluded were “actual injuries as the result
of the INS’ conduct.”97
The churches alleged that, as a result of the INS
surveillance, the organization suffered from the withdrawal of
members from active participation in church, a decline in the
amount of support given to the church, members’ reluctance in
seeking counseling or being open during prayer, and a diversion
of the clergies’ time from regular pastoral duties to those related
to handling the shortfall due to the surveillance.98 News of the
government infiltration and “bugging” of conversations also left
congregants with a sense of fear and apprehension that led to a
distinct impact on their church attendance and morale.99 The

93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at 623–29.
Id. at 623; Smith, supra note 24, at 139.
Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 520 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 520–21.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 521–22.
Id. at 522.

Do Not Delete

592

2/16/2015 10:14 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:2

Court of Appeals rejected the INS’s argument that the alleged
“chilling effect” on the congregants’ religious exercise and
expression was too speculative and conjectural, and that it did
not derive from “coercive action” by the government.100 In fact,
the court held that “[t]he alleged effect on the churches is not a
mere subjective chill on their worship activities; it is a concrete,
demonstrable decrease in attendance at those worship activities.
The injury to the churches is ‘distinct and palpable.’”101
The court’s analysis here also distinguished Laird
v. Tatum102 from the case at bar.103 In Laird, the plaintiffs
alleged injury from the mere “‘existence and operation’” of a
domestic surveillance program administered by the Army, and
did not claim a “‘specific present objective harm or threat of
specific future harm.’”104 While Presbyterian was mostly decided
on standing issues,105 the plaintiffs would only need to
substantiate their factual allegations regarding the diminished
church attendance, cancellation of Bible class, and the diversion
of clergy time to non-pastoral duties related to handling the
fallout from the surveillance in order to establish that the INS’s
surveillance “directly interfered with the churches’ ability to
carry out their religious mission.”106 Thus, the court set forth as
persuasive authority the principle that “[c]hurches, as
organizations, suffer a cognizable injury when assertedly illegal
government conduct deters their adherents from freely
participating in religious activities protected by the First
Amendment.”107
B. Muslim American Associational Rights Infringed
The jurisprudence on associational rights discussed above
provides a few key methods of first assessing whether
government conduct rises to the kind of level that merits strict
Id.
Id. Interestingly, the court also pointed out the idea that the church suffered
something similar to “reputational” or “professional” harm because of the negative impact
that knowledge of the INS infiltration had on the church’s image, ability to raise funds,
and the religious services they offered. Id. at 522–23.
102 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
103 Presbyterian, 870 F.2d at 522.
104 Laird, 408 U.S. at 9–11; Presbyterian, 870 F.2d at 522.
105 See Presbyterian, 870 F.2d at 520–23.
106 Id. at 523; Smith, supra note 24, at 143.
107 Presbyterian, 870 F.2d at 523. The plaintiffs had pled for, inter alia, injunctive
relief in the form of a court order prohibiting the INS from continuing the surveillance
without first showing a compelling interest. Id. at 521. The court went on to note that
because the criminal prosecution related to the investigation and surveillance was
already underway, it was unable to assess the likelihood that the churches would be
subjected to the surveillance again, and therefore remanded that issue to be decided by
the district court. Id. at 523.
100
101
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scrutiny, and then deciding whether the “compelling interest”
and “narrowly tailored” elements of the strict scrutiny test itself
are met. As established by case law, government conduct that
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate should
be subjected to strict scrutiny.108 Such “effects” have included
“economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical
coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”109 The
Ninth Circuit provided more relevant examples of suppression of
religious expression, including (1) withdrawal by congregants
from actively participating, (2) decline in financial support or
donations, (3) congregants’ reluctance in seeking religious
counseling or being open during prayer, (4) diversion of clergies’
or religious leaders’ time from congregation duties to dealing
with the effects of surveillance, and (5) fear or apprehension of
conversations being “bugged” (recorded), which have a negative
impact on congregants’ morale.110 Muslim American surveillance
has exhibited similarly chilling effects on mosque-goers,
demonstrating the need for strict scrutiny application of the
government programs aimed at widespread Muslim surveillance.
Like the curtailment the Court found in Patterson, Muslim
Americans in regions like the East Coast have also suffered from
the loss of business; diminished or affected employment
opportunities;111 “other manifestations of public hostility” such as
stigma;112 and the enabling or furthering justification of hate
crimes against Muslims113 because of the specter left upon the
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958).
Id. at 462.
Presbyterian, 870 F.2d at 521–22.
MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 30–31 (“Several young, educated [Muslim]
professionals . . . expressed concern that the public discourse about radicalization within
Muslim communities, further propagated by the NYPD’s surveillance program, would
affect their colleagues’ impressions of them. . . . [For example, two] interviewees, both
young attorneys working at corporate law firms, felt that they could not engage in pro
bono work on issues relating to Muslim civil rights and Muslim immigrants generally
because the firm does not want to get entangled (even indirectly) in these controversial
issues.”).
112 Id. at 29 (noting that such state-sponsored targeting of Muslim Americans has
ingrained stigmatic harm against their community). Muslim Americans “fear that their
colleagues, neighbors, classmates or customers will view them with suspicion because law
enforcement has branded them a population ‘of concern’ that is prone to dangerous
behavior. . . . [This can] contribute to an overall public discourse that is hostile towards
Muslims.” Id.; see also Susan J. Tabrizi, At What Price? Security, Civil Liberties, and
Public Opinion in the Age of Terrorism, in AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN ERA OF TERRORISM 185, 193–95 (David B. Cohen & John W. Wells eds.,
2004) (discussing American public support for racial profiling based measures to fight
terrorism in the years after 9/11, such as stopping and questioning “anyone who fits the
general description of suspected terrorists” and questioning 5000 immigrants from the
Middle East without more cause than their religion or national origin).
113 Mark Potok, FBI Reports Dramatic Spike in Anti-Muslim Hate Violence,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2011, 2:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-potok/
108
109
110
111
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Muslim community in the wake of media reports of NYPD
surveillance.114 Moreover, the surveillance of Muslims has placed
a particularly ominous mark on the community through the
government’s use of informants to infiltrate mosques, Muslim
Student Associations on college campuses, and the Muslim
community in general.
1. The Informant Problem
The government’s use of informants to infiltrate mosques
throughout the country is particularly troubling, reminiscent of
the days of COINTELPRO and the massive distrust the
government sowed throughout the politically dissident
community.115 Agencies like the FBI—and by extension local law
enforcement like the NYPD—have aggressively sought to recruit
and send informants to mosques to infiltrate Muslim American
communities, befriend unwitting mosque attendees, Muslim
community leaders, and even Muslim student organization
members to record, report, and in many instances, incite violence
or discussions of violence to see which Muslims will be caught in
the dragnet.116 Investigative journalist and author Trevor
Aaronson dedicated years to studying the terrorism prosecutions
that resulted from the use of government informants.117
According to data he collected in August 2011, almost ten years
since 9/11, out of 508 terrorism defendants, “243 had been
targeted through an FBI informant, 158 had been caught in an
FBI terrorism sting, and 49 had encountered an agent
provocateur.”118 By numbers alone, then, during that time period,
nearly forty-eight percent of the defendants prosecuted for

fbi-reports-dramatic-spik_b_1092996.html; see also GALLUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 40
(noting that compared to other major national religious groups—Protestant, Catholic,
Jewish, and Mormon—and people who do not ascribe to a religion, Muslims are most
likely to have experienced racial or religious discrimination); Interview with Fatima
Dadabhoy, supra note 33 (highlighting that the prosecution of Muslim Americans through
what “should be legally considered entrapment” fuels the fire for hate groups to speak in
favor of such surveillance and prosecutions against Muslims).
114 See MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 31 (“By singling out Muslims as
potentially dangerous, as meriting close law enforcement attention, and by not applying
the same standards as for other New Yorkers, the NYPD communicates, and perpetuates,
negative stereotypes about all American Muslims.”) (emphasis added).
115 “In fact, the FBI today has ten times as many informants as it did in the 1960s,
when former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover made the Bureau infamous for inserting spies
into organizations as varied as Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s and the Ku Klux
Klan.” AARONSON, supra note 26, at 26; see also id. at 44–45.
116 See generally Aziz, supra note 49, at 187–90. The NYPD’s Intelligence Division
went as far as sending one informant to canvass a white-water river-rafting trip held by a
Muslim Student Association, because such an activity apparently merited suspicion .
MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 40.
117 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 11–15.
118 Id. at 15.
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terrorism-related crimes had been apprehended by the use of a
government-sent informant, tasked with setting up—and often
supplying materials for—a terror plot and bringing the targeted
individual into the fold of it.119
The informant stories are all quite similar.120 An FBI
informant—usually with a checkered past121—is tasked with
posing as a Muslim with “contacts” to terrorist organizations and
told to approach certain targets who are often antisocial, almost
“loner” types with few ties to a community122—and sometimes
with mental health issues123—to conjure a terror plot that will
lead to those individuals’ prosecution and conviction.124 Hefty
financial incentives abound for the informants, who can be paid
up to $100,000 or more per case, with the added possibility of
earning tens of thousands more if their operation results in a
conviction.125 The FBI does not stop there, supplying the
informants with thousands of dollars at their disposal to offer as
financial inducements to their targets, thereby increasing the
likelihood they will get a “prosecutable” case.126 In addition, the
FBI often uses the vulnerable immigration statuses of some
Muslims (e.g., an overstayed student visa or undocumented
status) to coerce or exert immense pressure upon immigrant
Muslims to become informants in exchange for their immigration
problems “going away.”127 Such individuals are faced with the
119 Id. at 234 (“Most of the targets in these stings were poor, uneducated, and easily
manipulated. In many cases, it’s likely they wouldn’t have come up with the idea at all
without prodding by one of the FBI’s 15,000 registered informants.”).
120 See Sherman, supra note 59, at 1499.
121 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 155–80 (discussing the FBI’s use of criminals as
informants, including—among others—a convicted rapist and child molestor, drug
dealers, a man on parole for bank fraud, and a suspected murderer).
122 Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, supra note 33.
123 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 138, 175–76, 195.
124 For a survey of several informant stories that Aaronson and others have argued
verge on or constitute entrapment, see generally id. at 9–11, 19–24, 31–33, 91–97,
106 −07, 115–35, 137–51; Aziz, supra note 49, at 214–15, 217; MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra
note 1, at 40–45; Said, supra note 42, at 712–32; Teresa Watanabe & Paloma Esquivel,
L.A. Area Muslims Say FBI Surveillance Has a Chilling Effect on Their Free Speech and
Religious Practices, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/01/
local/me-muslim1 (discussing infamous infiltration of informant Craig Monteilh into
mosque communities in Orange County, California and the Muslim community response).
125 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 45.
126 See id. at 146, 148, 177, 187 (describing, for example, how during one operation,
an informant paid for the targeted individuals’ rent, offered to buy one target a
barbershop, and was authorized by the FBI to offer $5000 to each of the four recruited
men to stage a terrorist plot); see also Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, supra note 33
(noting one case where an informant in his thirties befriended two young converts in their
early twenties, bought them laptops, and paid them to participate in a terrorist plot).
127 For accounts of some ways the FBI has used immigration status or threats of
deportation to strong arm individuals into becoming informants, see AARONSON, supra
note 26, at 91–93, 98–101; see also Said, supra note 42, at 710. According to renowned
immigration law expert Ira Kurzban, “‘It’s clearly the modus operandi of the FBI to (a)
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“choice” of either being deported, or, if they refuse, being
prosecuted for terrorism crimes themselves.128 Even Muslim
Americans with lawful status are approached by the FBI to
become informants and threatened with being placed on the
no-fly list and barred from commercial air travel.129
The lengths to which the FBI has gone and is apparently
willing to go to keep the informant system in place—despite its
legally dubious nature—shows how adamant the agency is in
employing morally suspect informants to catch would-be
terrorists in terror plots orchestrated by the FBI.130 Also
troubling is the fabrication of reports by informants that are later
used in prosecuting the suspected terrorists who were the targets
of such operations all along.131 But perhaps most disconcerting is
the FBI’s heavy hand in, as Aaronson argues, “manufacturing”
these terror plots in order to implicate an easy target into taking
the blame. Prosecuting someone and placing them behind bars
creates palpable, tangible evidence the Bureau can point to as
proof they are doing their job.132 In fact, during the 2011
“Newburgh Four” sentencing of four ill-equipped and
impressionable men who were walked through the steps of a
terrorism plot with an experienced FBI informant, presiding U.S.
District Judge Colleen McMahon noted:
“The essence of what occurred here is that the government,
understandably zealous to protect its citizens from terrorism, came
upon a man both bigoted and suggestible, one who was incapable of
committing an act of terrorism on his own . . . . [The government]
created acts of terrorism out of his fantasies of bravado and bigotry,
and then made those fantasies come true . . . . I suspect real terrorists

recruit people who are going to be informants and (b) to use whatever leverage they can to
get them to be informants.’” AARONSON, supra note 26, at 99.
128 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 91–98.
129 See, e.g., Eyder Peralta, In Lawsuit, American Muslims Claim FBI Used No-Fly
List to Bully Them, NPR (Apr. 23, 2014, 2:33 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2014/04/23/306223445/in-lawsuit-american-muslims-claim-fbi-used-no-fly-list-to-bull
y-them; AARONSON, supra note 26, at 103–05.
130 See AARONSON, supra note 26, at 106 (noting the FBI told informant Craig
Monteilh to dig up any information that could be used to pressure Muslims into becoming
informants, including immigration status issues, criminal activity, drug use, and
extramarital affairs and sanctioned his engagement in sexual relationships with women
to “engender trust” with people); see also Complaint, supra note 3, at 8–9. For a detailed
overview of major cases Human Rights Watch studied, looking at the kinds of “inciting
tactics” used by informants against their targets, see generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 59, at 23–26 (noting, among other tactics, an informant sending one target
websites and photographs of human rights abuses of Muslims, including a young Iraqi
girl’s rape by an American and children mangled, decapitated, or burned alive).
131 See Said, supra note 42, at 726–27 & n.245 (describing how “wholly fabricated”
words and “routinely exaggerated” reports by one informant served as the basis of one
FBI case that led to a fifteen year prison sentence).
132 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 234.
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would not have bothered themselves with a person who was so utterly
inept . . . . Only the government could have made a terrorist out of Mr.
Cromitie [the primary defendant], whose buffoonery is positively
Shakespearean in scope.”133

She went on to say, “I believe beyond a shadow of a doubt
that there would have been no crime here except the government
instigated it, planned it and brought it to fruition.”134 As Judge
McMahon so succinctly put it, the reality is that the government
can make a terrorist out of even the most unassuming and
incompetent individuals, which bears a striking resemblance to
classic entrapment cases like United States v. Hollingsworth.135
While a full discussion on the legality and utility of
informants is beyond the scope of this Comment, the effects of
government informants on the Muslim American community is
particularly relevant to Muslims’ right to freedom of association.
Aside from the ramifications of distrust and suspicion that such
use of informants has on the Muslim community, sending
informants amongst Muslim groups—whether they are mosques
or Muslim Student Associations—“may . . . interfer[e] with a
group’s expressive association merely by occupying membership
positions for reasons other than furthering the group’s goals.”136
Informant infiltration has sent waves through Muslim American
communities throughout the country, and understandably so.137
It breeds fear amongst individual Muslims, who are forced to

133 Id. at 150 (quoting U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon). Judge McMahon
sentenced the defendants to twenty-five years in prison, the minimum allowed under
federal guidelines, refusing to order life in prison, which the government had sought. Id.
at 150–51; Graham Rayman, Newburgh 4 Terror Case: Judge Sentences Three to 25 Years
in Prison, U.S. Constitution Shivers, VILLAGE VOICE (June 29, 2011, 3:33 PM), http://
blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2011/06/newburgh_4_terr_3.php. For an account of
the FBI informant’s pursuit of Cromitie as a potential terrorist target and the progression
of the terrorism scheme, see Paul Harris, Newburgh Four: Poor, Black, and Jailed Under
FBI ‘Entrapment’ Tactics, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2011/dec/12/newburgh-four-fbi-entrapment-terror, and AARONSON, supra note 26, at
137 −51.
134 Harris, supra note 133.
135 U.S. v. Hollingsworth, 9 F.3d 593, 595–96, 599–600 (7th Cir. 1993), aff’d en banc,
27 F.3d 1196, 1199–200 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Said, supra note 42, at 697–98 (“[T]he
government creates a serious risk of inducing crime when it provides the means for
individuals to carry out crimes that they otherwise would not have been able to commit.”).
136 Smith, supra note 24, at 148. Smith describes the usual trajectory that comes from
the aftermath of the informant’s infiltration: “Once the alleged plot is complete, and the
government prosecutes the individuals involved, members become suspicious of each
other, attendance declines, and individuals become reluctant to discuss religious or
political issues.” Id.
137 See, e.g., Watanabe & Esquivel, supra note 124; H.G. Reza, New Fears in Muslim
Community Follow Reports of U.S. Monitoring, L.A. TIMES (May 29, 2008), http://articles.
latimes.com/2008/may/29/local/me-mosques29; FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE ,
RETHINKING RADICALIZATION 21–23 (2011), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/f737
600b433d98d25e_6pm6beukt.pdf.
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wonder whether their Muslim neighbor, new friend from the
Muslim Student Association, or person praying next to them at
the mosque is actually an informant.138 For example, one report
on the NYPD surveillance of Muslims found that “[n]early all
interviewees thought they knew someone who was an informant
or an undercover officer.”139 Whether or not they were right is
beside the point. Only one religious group, Muslim Americans, in
the greater New York City area admitted that they knew or
thought they knew of an individual who was specifically sent by
their local law enforcement to their mosque or religious
community simply to track their movements and record and
report on their statements to find and prosecute terrorists. This
shows the disproportionate burden placed on American Muslims
today.140
The actions of the government have created a climate of
suspicion amongst the Muslim American community. In the
wake of reports of informant Craig Monteilh infiltrating Orange
County mosques in Southern California, Hussam Ayloush,
Executive Director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations
(CAIR) in Los Angeles, stated in 2010 that “[e]very Muslim I
know just assumes that the person praying next to them is an
informant.”141 Much like the observations of Imam Raza,142
religious leader of the Brooklyn mosque and named plaintiff in
the 2013 lawsuit, “[i]n mosques around the country, newcomers
are met with a suspicion that didn’t exist before 9/11—a
particularly sad state of affairs, as for centuries mosques had
138 Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, supra note 33 (“When cases like these break, it
doesn’t just impact the defendant or even his family. It impacts the whole community,
because all those who know that individual are then approached by the FBI to get more
information from them about themselves and about the defendant.”).
139 MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 26.
140 In Presbyterian, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held: “When congregants are
chilled from participating in worship activities, when they refuse to attend church
services because they fear the government is spying on them and taping their every
utterance . . . we think a church suffers organizational injury because its ability to carry
out its ministries has been impaired.” Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d
518, 522 (9th Cir. 1989).
141 AARONSON, supra note 26, at 112; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 59,
at 23 (“Some of the cases we reviewed appear to have begun as virtual fishing expeditions,
where the FBI had no basis to suspect a particular individual of a propensity to commit
terrorist acts. In those cases, the informant identified a specific target by randomly
initiating conversations near a mosque. Assigned to raise controversial religious and
political topics, these informants probed their targets’ opinions on politically sensitive and
nuanced subjects, sometimes making comments that appeared designed to inflame the
targets. If a target’s opinions were deemed sufficiently troubling, officials concerned with
nascent radicalization pushed the sting operation forward.”). Given the backdrop of an
environment like this, it is no wonder that Muslim Americans attending a mosque would
reasonably fear that the person who just came up to speak with them may in fact be an
informant, casting out his net for potential sting operation leads.
142 See supra notes 1–16 and accompanying text.
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been considered welcoming places for strangers and travelers, a
tradition that dates back to . . . the earliest days of Islam.”143
2. Self-Censorship of Religious and Political Expression
According to civil rights attorney Fatima Dadabhoy, Muslim
religiosity has become a reason for closer government scrutiny.
Based on questions FBI agents pose in “voluntary interviews,” it
is as if “just the act of going to a mosque and being religious is
suspicious.”144 Questions such as “What mosque do you go to?”
“How often do you to go the mosque?” and “What made you
decide to become religious?” are commonly asked by the FBI and
are apparently meant to gauge the level of the individual’s
“suspiciousness.”145 Such forms of surveillance and intelligence
gathering have resulted in what the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals called a “withdrawal” of mosque attendees.
In 2009, after news broke of Craig Monteilh, the notorious
FBI informant who infiltrated mosques and Muslim communities
in Orange County, California, many Muslims in the area simply
stopped attending their mosque, unable to partake in and receive
their religious services out of fear that the FBI would spy on
them too.146 Donations at the Islamic Center of Norco in Corona,
California declined thirty to fifty percent in the years leading up
to the revelation of the informant, which was attributed in part
to the economy’s decline, but also to the very real consequences of
prosecutions under the “material support” statute.147
In 2011, when Associated Press investigative reporting
revealed the NYPD surveillance of Muslims and the existence of
a pervasive informant named Shamiur Rahman, “[there was] a
steep decline in mosque attendance, as the number of
worshippers
attending
afternoon
prayers
on
weekdays . . . declined from approximately twenty people to just

AARONSON, supra note 26, at 112.
Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, supra note 33; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 59, at 18–19 (noting the FBI’s use of “voluntary interviews” and events
presented as “community outreach” to gather information from American Muslims,
further fueling the Muslim American community’s fears and distrust of law enforcement).
145 Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, supra note 33; see also MAPPING MUSLIMS,
supra note 1, at 12 (noting that due to NYPD surveillance, “attendance at a mosque—a
religious duty for many Muslims—has become tantamount to placing oneself on law
enforcement’s radar”); AARONSON, supra note 26, at 53 (discussing how an FBI training
manual released by Wired magazine instructed that “[t]he more devout a Muslim
was . . . the more likely he was to be violent”). Such “radicalization theories” have been
largely debunked in Patel’s report. See generally PATEL, supra note 137, at 3–18.
146 Watanabe & Esquivel, supra note 124.
147 Id. (“Since 9/11, federal authorities have also shut down at least six of the Muslim
community’s major charitable organizations, accusing them of involvement in terrorist
financing.”); see also Reza, supra note 137; 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012).
143
144
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two or three people.”148 With news of such informant operations,
some Muslim Americans have become much more wary of what
they say in the presence of others, out of fear it will be recorded
or misconstrued in a manner that can incriminate them.149 In
fact, even speaking Urdu or Arabic in public could prompt
surveillance.150 Muslim business owners, who have also been
targeted, are affirmatively censoring what TV programming is
shown in their establishment and what kinds of discussions are
had there.151 To some, it is a frustrating result of sweeping
generalizations, a burden Muslims have to shoulder simply
because of the religion they belong to.152 What makes their
situation even more challenging is the fact that Muslim
Americans are so afraid they do not even wish to speak out
openly against the surveillance leveled against them, lest they
come on the government’s radar or trigger even more scrutiny for
their actions.153 Such effects of government surveillance have
resulted in the kind of fear and apprehension that the church
members in Presbyterian felt upon learning that government
agents were infiltrating their churches wearing “body bugs” and
recording conversations.154
Moreover, just like the clergy in Presbyterian who were
diverted away from their religious duties in order to deal with
the effects of the surveillance on their congregants,155 mosque
leaders like Imam Raza have had to divert time away from their
responsibilities to their congregation to handle the fallout in
148 Complaint, supra note 3, at 15. See Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870
F.2d 518, 522 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The alleged effect on the churches is not a mere subjective
chill on their worship activities; it is a concrete, demonstrable decrease in attendance at
those worship activities.”).
149 MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 18. One New York area Sunday school teacher
stated, “I have to think twice about the sentences I say just in case someone can come up
with a different meaning to what I’m saying.” Id.
150 Id. at 20.
151 Id. In a feat of illustrative irony, leaked NYPD documents showed that the law
enforcement agency already knew that one Muslim business owner stopped showing
Al-Jazeera on his television because he did not want to bring unwanted attention from the
government. Id. at 22. It appears his attempts were in vain.
152 One Muslim woman felt caught in a Catch-22: “When your speech is limited, you
can’t really do much: you can’t write on the internet, you can’t talk on the phone because
they’re tapped, you can’t speak in public.” Id. at 23; see also Complaint, supra note 3, at
13.
153 MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 41 (noting some Muslim Student Associations
implemented bans on political discussions to prevent further surveillance). For a personal
account of the NYPD surveillance experience from a New York University Muslim law
student, see Elizabeth Dann, Singling Us Out: NYPD’s Spying on Muslim Americans
Creates Fear and Distrust, AM. C IV. LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.ac
lu.org/blog/racial-justice-national-security-religion-belief/singling-us-out-nypds-spying-mu
slim-americans.
154 See Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 522 (9th Cir. 1989).
155 Id.
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their membership caused by the government surveillance. For
example, Raza purchased a professional camera and three
external hard drives to save the videos of sermons he gave, in
order to have proof of his own words in case he would need to
defend himself if his words were taken out of context—all of
which cost the mosque about $2200.156 He has had to devote
hours to mediate conflicts that arise between mosque
congregants about the suspicion and distrust that has come
between some due to informant infiltration.157 Thus, the
government’s conduct within the sphere of surveillance in the
name of counterterrorism has caused a “distinct and palpable”158
chilling effect upon the Muslim American community and their
freedom of association.
3. Applying the Roberts Strict Scrutiny Test to Surveillance
of Muslim Americans
Under the strict scrutiny test as applied here, (1) the
government purpose for the surveillance must be compelling,
(2) it must be unrelated to the suppression of ideas, and (3) there
must be no other less restrictive means of achieving that
purpose.159 First, while gross injustices have been carried out
against racial minorities in the name of national security, the
Court has repeatedly held that national security is a compelling
interest that would suffice the “purpose” prong of the strict
scrutiny test.160 It cannot be denied that the true costs of life,
limb, stability, and security that come from terrorism of all forms
are serious and tragic. They warrant true vigilance and swift
action by authorities when a pressing danger presents itself.
While the debates about the existence of “real” national security
Complaint, supra note 3, at 10–11.
Id. at 15.
Presbyterian, 807 F.2d at 522 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); see supra notes 85, 88–94 and
accompanying text.
160 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944) (upholding
Japanese and Japanese American internment for national security threats in World War
II); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 305 (1981) (“The Court recognized that the legitimacy of
the objective of safeguarding our national security is ‘obvious and inarguable.’”) (citing
Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
507, 509 n.3 (1980) (“The Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the
secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of
confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service.”).
But see United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972) (“National security cases . . . often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth
Amendment values not present in cases of ‘ordinary’ crime. Though the investigative duty
of the executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to
constitutionally protected speech.”); Parker, supra note 38, at 162 (“Too often in our
history unfounded suspicions based on free association have led to intrusive forms of
unwarranted domestic information collection in the name of national security.”).
156
157
158
159
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issues161 are outside the scope of this discussion, if the
government’s asserted purpose in the widespread surveillance of
Muslim Americans, informant infiltration, and sting operations
is national security, past precedent has established that such a
purpose is, indeed, compelling.
Second, while the government may argue that its purpose or
intention with the surveillance is not to dissuade expression, the
reality is that it is still having a concrete impact on Muslim
American expression. Nonetheless, absent facts indicating
otherwise, this analysis will operate upon the assumed
presumption that the government’s purpose was not related to an
intent to actually dissuade expression.
Third, and finally, this leaves the primary issue: whether the
government’s methods are truly narrowly tailored. The Court has
held that “even though the governmental purpose be legitimate
and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved.”162 The means used here have consisted
of sweeping, undiscerning surveillance; the targeting of the
Muslim American community; and the act of doing so without
articulable suspicion or probable cause, other than the
observation that the group targeted belongs to—or appears to
belong to—the Islamic faith.
As many have argued,163 the government need not use such
sweeping methods of law enforcement to achieve their goal of
counterterrorism. In fact, these approaches have proved
counterproductive, and instead have led to significant backlash
from the Muslim American community itself, which feels
suspicious and distrustful of the government.164 This, in turn, has

161 See generally HERMAN, supra note 76, at 207 (discussing how during Korematsu,
the government withheld facts in the report provided to the Supreme Court of the United
States in order to establish that a “national security” threat existed).
162 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (declaring unconstitutional a state law
requiring all teachers to annually disclose their group memberships).
163 See, e.g., Aziz, supra note 49, at 222–23 (asserting that current counterterrorism
methods subordinate Muslim Americans by targeting them unnecessarily); Atif
Choudhury, Confessions of a Former Muslim Students Association Board Member,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 25, 2014, 2:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/atif-choud
hury/confessions-muslims-students-association_b_4863368.html (“Categorically bugging
all mosques and ‘infiltrating’ [Muslim Student Associations] might be the quick and easy
option for our government to show us that it is ‘doing something’ to combat terror, but is it
really the most optimal method for serious law enforcement?”).
164 Muslim Americans have the lowest confidence in the FBI, compared to other
major national religious groups (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Mormon) and those who do
not have a religion. GALLUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 24; see also Aziz, supra note 49, at
198 (“When coupled with multiple discoveries that informants have induced young
Muslim men with diminished mental capacity or financial problems toward violence, it

Do Not Delete

2015]

2/16/2015 10:14 AM

The More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble You Can Be

603

shut off the possibility of fruitful cooperation amongst the
government and the Muslim American community, because they
constantly feel treated as a suspect class, rather than a
productive, equal partner.165 As Part III will discuss, there are
many other means the government can employ that are less
restrictive than the ones currently in place.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: OPTIMISTIC, BUT REALISTIC
As discussed in Parts I and II, the government’s current
methods of fighting domestic terrorism are exceeding
constitutional bounds because they are not narrowly tailored to
achieving the goal of fighting domestic terrorism. While much
has been discussed about the problems that the government’s
methods pose,166 articulating solutions for this issue is
particularly difficult, given the varied and competing interests of
all the players involved.167 Thus, it may be fruitful to step outside
the traditional bounds of this discussion to seek possible
solutions from other contexts. At the heart of the government’s
concern here is domestic terrorism. Analyzing the government’s
domestic counterterrorism strategies through the lens of gang
injunction and gang intervention models in the United States
proves illuminating in understanding what methods, articulated
goals, and types of administration have been effective—or at
least promising—and which have been detrimental.
Before embarking on this analysis, however, it should be
noted that while there are some common themes between both,
domestic terrorism and gang violence also have their obvious
differences.168 On the one hand, the problem of gang violence in

should come as no surprise that some Muslim communities are distrustful of state and
federal law enforcement agencies[] . . . .”).
165 PATEL, supra note 137, at 29–31 (urging the repudiation of prior biases regarding
Muslim “radicalization”); MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 1, at 46–47 (describing boycotts
and protests in response to NYPD surveillance); Aziz, supra note 49, at 223 (“[A]s they
beseech their government to respect their civil liberties, Muslims must also seek the
protection of law enforcement against private acts of violence and discrimination. For
many Muslims, the government may come across as more foe than friend.”).
166 See supra notes 49–70 and accompanying text.
167 E.g., Muslim Americans, Muslim community leaders, local law enforcement, and
the federal government to name a few.
168 Interestingly, there was a case in New York where gang violence was prosecuted
under an anti-terrorism statute. In 2012, a gang member who shot and wounded another
rival gang member to avenge his friend’s death also accidentally shot and killed a
ten-year-old girl. Glenn Greenwald, New York’s Top Court Highlights the Meaninglessness
and Menace of the Term ‘Terrorism’, GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2012, 6:36 AM), http://www.the
guardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/16/court-terrorism-morales-gangs-meaningless. In
People v. Morales, the gang member was prosecuted and found guilty at the trial court
level under an anti-terrorism statute. Id. The New York Court of Appeals overturned the
conviction. Id.
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the United States is similar to domestic terrorism due to both of
their troubling potential to cause loss of life and disruption of
social stability. Both threats often also come from those
individuals who are, or feel, marginalized by society.169 However,
both phenomena are different in that gang violence is more
embedded within the fabric of daily life in many urban centers of
the United States, such that its effects are largely localized;
while threats of terrorism are more sporadic or intermittent,
unpredictable, and have a wider effect on a national—and even
international—level.170 Nonetheless, the most common thread
between the two issues is how the government has attempted to
address them and the challenges they each pose, not only to law
enforcement, but also those communities most affected by it. This
Comment presents two recommendations: First, there should be
end to the constitutionally suspect practice of surveillance of
Muslim Americans without prior evidence of wrongdoing because
this method is not narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling
interest of national security. Second, to address those individuals
who have found themselves feeling marginalized by society, the
Muslim American community could implement grassroots
“intervention” or “prevention” programs for individuals who
exhibit signs of potentially going down a path of violence because
they lack access to proper resources to address the sources of
their marginalization.
A. Cease Widespread Surveillance of Muslim Americans
The government—both federal and local—should stop the
practice of widespread, suspicionless surveillance of Muslim
Americans in the form of mosque infiltration and informant sting
operations. Community and grassroots activists, legal civil rights
groups, and Muslim American leaders are all calling for the end
of such a practice.171 Choosing to spy on Muslims simply because
169 See, e.g., Irving A. Spergel, Youth Gangs: Continuity and Change, 12 CRIME
& JUST. 171, 259 (1990) (noting that in particular, youths become gang members to
“develop[] alternate social, cultural, and economic sub-systems to meet common human
needs in an increasingly complex urban society”); Thomas A. Myers, Note, The
Unconstitutionality, Ineffectiveness, and Alternatives of Gang Injunctions, 14 MICH . J.
RACE & L. 285, 302 (2009) (quoting the Sergeant of the Washington D.C. Police
Department as stating that the root of the gang violence problem is a social one).
170 E.g., drive-by shooting on a street corner targeting local individuals versus a
bombing in a large public place targeting many and prompting national and international
attention.
171 See MAPPING MUSLIMS , supra note 1, at 50–51 (calling for the end of “blanket
surveillance of the Muslim population of New York City and its environs”); No a Yachot,
NYPD Shutters Muslim Mapping Unit – But What About Other Tactics?, AM.
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 15, 2014, 7:01 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/nationalsecurity-religion-belief/nypd-shutters-muslim-spying-unit-what-about-its-tactics (noting
discriminatory surveillance practices that still exist after the NYPD officially disbanded
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they are Muslim and attend a mosque is based upon a faulty172
and invidious presumption that terrorist threats only come from
Muslims, and namely those Muslims who are more “religious.”173
Such a presumption must be retracted in order for the
government’s approach to be narrowly tailored. Moreover, the
current surveillance techniques have not proved effective in
achieving their stated goals. In 2012, Assistant Chief Thomas
Galati of the NYPD himself attested under oath that during the
more than six years of its implementation, the surveillance
program did not yield a single lead, nor did it spark the need to
initiate any terror investigations.174 There are also limits to how
useful a tool surveillance can be for crime prevention.175
Myers argues that gang injunctions, which literally
criminalize associative behaviors such as walking down the
street or riding in a car with another individual who is suspected
to be a gang member, are unconstitutional for the same reasons
that Muslim surveillance is: there are other reasonable
alternatives to achieving the government’s goal of fighting gang
violence.176 The criteria that law enforcement use to label
someone a gang member has been seen as too subjective,
arbitrary, and burdensome of expressive rights, such as the
ability to wear a certain colored t-shirt, sport a tattoo, or speak
with another person on the street.177 These are much like the
its Muslim mapping unit); Interview with Fatima Dadabhoy, supra note 33 (proposing as
part of the solution that the Muslim American community not be treated as a suspect
class).
172 In the United States, compared to other major religious groups (Protestant,
Catholic, Jewish, and Mormon) and those with no religion, Muslim Americans are the
most likely to reject violence through individual attacks on civilians. GALLUP REPORT ,
supra note 2, at 31.
173 In fact, frequent mosque attendance and a strong religious identity are associated
with greater civic engagement and emotional health among Muslim Americans. Id. at 44;
see also Aziz, supra note 49, at 182.
174 Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD: Muslim Spying Led to No Leads, Terror
Cases, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 21, 2012, available at http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-InThe-News/2012/NYPD-Muslim-spying-led-to-no-leads-terror-cases.
175 Bell & Webster, supra note 50, at 24 (“Surveillance can only anticipate up to a
point, and in some very limited circumstances. Searchable databases and international
communications interception were fully operational on September 10 to no avail. The
likely result will be that internal surveillance of citizens by the state will increase.”); see
also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 59, at 22 (quoting former FBI agent Michael
German) (“Today’s terrorism sting operations reflect a significant departure from past
practice. When the FBI undercover agent or informant is the only purported link to a real
terrorist group, supplies the motive, designs the plot, and provides all the weapons, one
has to question whether they are combatting terrorism or creating it. Aggrandizing the
terrorist threat with these theatrical productions only spreads public fear and divides
communities, which doesn’t make anyone safer.”).
176 Myers, supra note 169, at 303.
177 Id. Those who were labeled as gang members are disproportionately low income,
young, and people of color, which has led to “the criminalization of the[ir] daily lives.”
Beth Caldwell, Criminalizing Day-to-Day Life: A Socio-legal Critique of Gang Injunctions,

Do Not Delete

606

2/16/2015 10:14 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:2

“indicators” law enforcement use to label Muslims as terrorist
threats because of their garb, physical appearance, or political
ideologies. Thus, Myers’s call for “[t]ighter and more definite
standards, like beyond a reasonable doubt” for law enforcement
to meet before subjecting an individual to closer scrutiny within
the gang injunction context also applies to Muslim
surveillance.178 In the early 1990s, Irving A. Spergel, an expert
on gangs, also suggested that gang intervention programs for
youth should focus on those who “are already engaged in
law-violating behaviors.”179 The latter idea is key in
implementing a successful approach, for then it means the
government’s method will truly be narrowly tailored to achieve
the government’s national security interest. Such a standard,
albeit simple, does not infringe upon free exercise, association, or
speech rights, but still does offer a basic minimum standard to
follow, creating something closer to a “bright line” rule.
Approaches such as the ones suggested for the gang context may
equally apply to the Muslim surveillance issue, for the
government should operate upon more than an individual’s mere
adherence to Islam to target them. This will also be more
narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s purpose of
protecting against domestic terrorism, because it will attempt to
target real criminals, rather than everyday mosque congregants.
B. Muslim American Community-Based Intervention Programs
The final proposition involves controversial and constantly
changing attitudes about how to address crime by using “the
community” as a vehicle for counterterrorism. The government’s
decision to conduct mosque surveillance and infiltration of
Muslim groups—along with the slew of prosecutions that have
resulted from such programs—has left Muslim Americans feeling
wary of who to trust in their own communities and, more
particularly, in the government.180 While many law enforcement
branches have community relations liaisons to attempt to
37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 241, 243 (2010). This is strikingly similar to the effect NYPD
surveillance had on the daily lives of Muslim Americans. See generally supra Part I.
178 Myers, supra note 169, at 303–04.
179 Spergel, supra note 169, at 262 (emphasis added).
180 Muslim Americans are afraid of providing information directly to the FBI due to
its aggressive use of informants, and instead prefer to provide information to civil rights
groups like CAIR, which then relay it to the government. AARONSON, supra note 26, at
113; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 59, at 20 (noting that the FBI justifies its
“domain mapping” program “by arguing that ‘terrorist and criminal groups target ethnic
and geographic communities for victimization and/or recruitment’”). The Human Rights
Watch report concludes that such an “approach to investigation is discriminatory and
counterproductive, undermining trust in authorities in precisely the communities where
law enforcement claims to want to build that trust.” Id.
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collaborate and forge ties with groups such as Muslim
Americans, much of these attempts by law enforcement have
been viewed with skepticism by Muslim American leaders.181
In the context of American gangs, Spergel has suggested
creating collaborative agencies consisting of many key players,
such as local government agencies, law enforcement, and
community groups, to address the issues of gang violence
through gang intervention.182 However optimistic the idea
sounds, the reality is that many conflicts arise with such a
multi-faceted body of groups attempting to work together,
because although they are all united in the cause of addressing
the same issue, they each may have decidedly different, if not
sometimes conflicting, interests.183 That is not to say, however,
that the gang intervention model is not a useful tool in
addressing true potential “at-risk” individuals. Currently, when
law enforcement, through its channels of intelligence, finds an
individual who appears susceptible to going down a path of
potential violence due to mental health, economic, or social
factors, rather than intervening to direct them to help, law
enforcement sends them an informant, who hatches a
prosecutable terror plot, which lands that individual in prison.
Not only does this exploit and permanently damage the
individual’s future, it does not really fight true terrorist threats.
This Comment proposes that instead of swooping in to
prosecute that individual, that person should be directed to the
proper services and resources to address the underlying issues
that placed this individual in such a position in the first place.184
181 See, e.g., MAPPING MUSLIMS , supra note 1, at 36–37 (discussing how NYPD
outreach efforts are counterproductive because they operate on the premise that all the
Muslims they interact with need to be “de-radicalized”); Aziz, supra note 49, at 150–52
(arguing that community policing “co-opts” Muslim American leaders into gathering
intelligence on their fellow Muslims because the government would not be able to
constitutionally reach such information); Jessica Garrison, Counter-Terrorism Becomes
Part of Law Enforcement, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/
06/nation/la-na-911-homeland-security-enforcement-20110907/2 (noting concerns by some
officials that the LAPD’s counterterrorism department trainings were spreading
misinformation and false rumors about how Muslim Americans wanted to impose
Shari’ah law the United States).
182 Spergel, supra note 169, at 261. He also suggested it be run by an official agency
with law enforcement or other rehabilitative or educational functions. Id.
183 E.g., the FBI or local law enforcement may feel the need to justify its budget and
seek to aggressively prosecute suspected Muslims of terror crimes, while Muslim
community leaders may seek to avoid making their members more vulnerable to already
targeted scrutiny by refusing to give any information about their congregation. See
AARONSON, supra note 26, at 113.
184 See Choudhury, supra note 163 (“Would not a smarter more effective use of our
law enforcement resources be to work with Muslim communities and organizations to
help identify these outliers rather than treating ‘existing while openly Muslim’ as a
crime?”).
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Such a plan of action would be a remarkable improvement upon
the current sense of distrust that exists between the Muslim
community and law enforcement. To address the problems of
gang violence, Myers suggested as an alternative to gang
injunctions social programs providing employment, education,
and even recreation opportunities to “would-be” gang
members.185 Such “prevention” or “intervention” programs would
aim to keep “would-be” gang members from following that path,
and similarly could allow law enforcement and community
relations to soften.186
Myers’s suggested gang intervention model fits quite well
into the Muslim American community context. As can be seen
from the stories Aaronson chronicled,187 the individuals
prosecuted for terrorism are precisely those “would-be” terrorists
who are more likely to suffer from mental, social, or emotional
problems than pose a real terrorist threat. One important
distinction, however, persists. It would be more fruitful to have
those social services programs provided from the “ground up” by
grassroots Muslim American community organizations. Their
presence would be a welcome sight to many Muslims who have
felt they have been treated as a suspect class for years.
Additionally, it would still help law enforcement accomplish its
goals of diminishing the threat of potential terrorism-related
violence, because such programs would reach out to the—as
Aaronson coins it—“wannabe” terrorists who, in reality, likely
need mental health counseling or social programs, not
prosecution and jail time.188 While there is no way for such
organizations to reach out to all these individuals—who are often
social outcasts outside the circle of a mosque or other
community—for those they can serve, such an effort would be
welcome relief from prosecution and imprisonment, cataclysmic
events that send waves through an entire community, not just
the defendant’s family and friends.
Perhaps most importantly, such a project could prove
particularly empowering to the Muslim American community,
which has experienced years of political and social
“subordination.”189 Unlike the kind of community policing Aziz
Myers, supra note 169, at 305.
Id. (“If would-be gang members are employed at a job, at an after-school program,
or are engaged in a recreational program[,] . . . then they will not be on the streets
engaging in violent gang activity.”).
187 See supra notes 120–135 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 120–135 and accompanying text.
189 Aziz, supra note 49, at 177–78 (“Subordination theory posits that particular
groups are racialized into the outsider ‘Other’ deserving of harsh treatment by the state to
protect the majority from a perceived threat. These ‘out-groups’ disproportionately carry
185
186
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describes and wholly refutes,190 this campaign would not be
instigated by government intervention, but rather would be
inspired by its own local Muslim communities that would seek to
provide social services to its community members. The only law
enforcement role present here would be its lack of a role, in that
it should refrain from targeting and prosecuting such vulnerable
individuals, along with implementing the suggested methods of
narrowing their surveillance methods to only those whose actions
constitute illegal conduct.
This model, based on the current realities of the Muslim
American experience, is cognizant of the discriminatory policies
and practices in place that perpetuate and erroneously conflate
terrorism and Islam. The only way society can move away from
such stigmatic stereotypes of an entire religious class is to firmly
reject such biased presumptions, in order to stop government
practices of de facto discrimination that offend the constitutional
principles of free exercise, speech, and association.
CONCLUSION
Although the government has proffered the compelling
interest of national security as a justification for its widespread
network of surveillance and informants for the purpose of
essentially monitoring Muslim American daily life, the means it
has employed are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive
strict scrutiny in the face of constitutional First Amendment
protections of free association and speech. This has led to a
significant “chilling” of religious and political expression, as well
as the curtailment of actual religious activities such as mosque
attendance, donations for charity, or participation in a Muslim
Student Association on college campuses. Through the refining of
the government’s scope of surveillance, and the creation of
objective, transparent criteria for individuals who do warrant
such government scrutiny, Muslim Americans can be secured
their fundamental rights, while still allowing law enforcement to
accomplish its goal of fighting actual terrorism. Additionally, the
government should not prosecute those vulnerable, and easily
susceptible individuals who were unsuspectingly caught in the
government “dragnet” of informant sting operations. Instead, law
enforcement should allow the Muslim American community its
own space to address the issue on its own terms, by offering such
individuals social programs and mental health services as

the burden of distributional inequalities arising from abusive practices sanctioned by the
majority.”) (footnotes omitted).
190 Id. at 213–17.
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needed, without fear of government scrutiny or prosecution. This
will not only empower Muslim Americans, a community largely
marginalized post 9/11, but also allow them to mold their own
destinies in this nation. It is not the place of a government based
on fundamental constitutional principles of freedom to punish
individuals for mere adherence to their faith, no matter how
stigmatized they are. Courts must now step in to uphold those
fundamental rights that have been pushed aside out of
misunderstanding and fear.

